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THE DUBIOUS UPGRADE OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS 
 
Gabriel Swiney∗ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Dozens of agencies fund development projects around the world. 
Some agencies are the creatures of states, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Other agencies are 
multinational or transnational, such as the Asian Development Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank. These 
agencies pursue development goals in a number of ways: they may 
promote the rule of law, give loans to government treasuries, or pay 
the salaries of local teachers. In addition, many development agencies 
fund a variety of crucial construction projects in developing countries. 
Construction projects are inherently rife with pitfalls. Design flaws 
can surface, unforeseen conditions can cause delays, natural or man-
made disasters can strike mid-project, and disputes can arise among 
funding agencies, local governments, and the contractors who actually 
perform the construction. The risky and complicated nature of these 
projects compels development agencies to utilize detailed contracts. 
These development agencies may be simultaneously funding dozens, if 
not hundreds, of international development contracts at any given 
time. 
Development agencies avoid the confusion and expense of 
hundreds of different contracts by using model contracts. These 
models provide a set of basic contractual provisions—often called the 
“General Conditions”—that can be copied verbatim for each 
construction project. The general contracting parties can amend and 
supplement the General Conditions as needed by attaching 
individualized “Particular Conditions” for specific projects.1  
There are a number of advantages to using model contracts. 
 
 
 
∗ J.D., Harvard Law School; Bachelor of Civil Law, University of Oxford. 
Member of the bar of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
1 For example, model International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) 
contracts and agreements are available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/ 
(last visited 21 Aug. 2006). 
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The use of standard forms is a source of 
contractual predictability and stability, thus reducing 
transaction cost for the participants. For example, a 
systematic approach to the tendering procedure that 
sets out a transparent and efficient approach for 
obtaining, evaluating, and selecting bidders will 
decrease the costs of tailor-made procedures.2 
 
Model contracts also reduce “the cost associated with risk, one of 
the most significant costs. This cost reduction is especially true for 
risks that are impractical to insure. One aim of standard clauses is 
indeed to address project risks and to specify how these risks are to be 
managed.”3  
Finally, the use of standard forms and model contracts reduces the 
transaction costs of contract formation itself. “Standard form contracts 
focus the parties’ attention on the terms that are normally open for 
negotiation, the transaction’s ‘basic negotiable elements,’ and allow 
the parties, indeed encourage them, to take the remainder for 
granted.”4 Thus, “any costs related to drafting and negotiating will 
consequently be reduced since the use of standard terms and 
conditions will avoid the need for protracted debate on detailed 
wording.”5 For these reasons, development agencies use model and 
standard-form contracts. 
Although development agencies use model contracts, the agencies 
do not write them. Following the commercial construction industry’s 
lead, development agencies use model contracts prepared by industry 
associations; the most popular of these is the International Federation 
of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC).6  
FIDIC provides a number of model contracts, each one targeted at 
a particular type of construction project. For example, the FIDIC 
designed one contract for use with traditional civil engineering 
projects, another for contractor-designed work, and yet another for 
 
 
2 Catherine Pédamon, How Is Convergence Best Achieved in International 
Project Finance?, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1272, 1296 (2001). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1297–98. 
5 Id. 
6 FIDIC: International Federation of Consulting Engineers, http://www.fidic.org 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 
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projects on a fixed-price or turnkey basis.7 This Article focuses on 
FIDIC’s traditional civil engineering construction contract, known 
informally as the “Red Book.”  
There are two versions of the Red Book.8 The first, published in 
1987,9 has found widespread use in private and public construction 
projects throughout the world. A newer version, published in 1999,10 
incorporates significant changes from the 1987 version, including 
changes in risk allocation and dispute resolution. Development 
agencies are free to use whichever version they choose. 
In addition to the Red Book, in 2005 FIDIC published a contract 
specifically designed for use in projects funded by multilateral 
development banks such as the World Bank, Asian, and Inter-
American Banks. The Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) contract 
is, in most respects, identical to the 1999 version of the Red Book.11  
The choice facing development agencies is clear: should they use 
the 1987 Red Book or switch to the 1999 and MDB versions of the 
model contract? This paper will attempt to answer that question. Part 
II of this paper will provide a brief summary of where development 
 
 
7 Differences between the various contracts are available at 
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/which_contract.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 
2006). 
8 In 1987, the FIDIC issued the first version of the Red Book, “Conditions of 
Contract for Works of Civil Engineering Construction.” In 1999, it issued the second 
version, entitled “Conditions of Contract for Construction.” (Note that FIDIC refers to 
the 1999 version as the first edition. See infra note 10.) 
9 FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS (FIDIC) 
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT 
FOR WORKS OF CIVIL ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION (1987) [hereinafter FIDIC 1987]. 
10 FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS (FIDIC) 
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT: CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION (1st ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
FIDIC 1999]. 
11 FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES INGÉNIEURS-CONSEILS (FIDIC) 
[INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS], CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT 
FOR CONSTRUCTION (Multi-lateral Development Bank [MDB] Harmonized ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter FIDIC MDB 2005]. For purposes of this paper, the 1999 Red Book and 
the MDB contract will be treated as equivalent. For a discussion of differences 
between the 1999 contract and the MDB contract, see Christopher Wade, Chairman of 
FIDIC Contracts Committee, Private Practice United Kingdom and Adviser, SWECO 
International, Sweden, The FIDIC Contract Forms and the New MDB Contract, Notes 
from Presentation Given at ICC-FIDIC Conference, Paris (Oct. 2005), 
http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/wade_oct05.pdf; see also FIDIC, 
Informational Article: Harmonised Form of FIDIC Construction Contract Agreed with 
Multi-Lateral Development Banks, http://www1.fidic.org/resources/mdb/ (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2006). 
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agencies currently stand regarding the choice of model contracts. Part 
III will compare the 1987 contract with the 1999 and MDB contracts, 
and Part IV will explore implications that the different contracts 
present as they relate to international development. Finally, Part V will 
offer some conclusions and recommendations for the future of 
international development contracts. 
 
II. THE POSITIONS OF THE AGENCIES 
 
Most of the major development agencies use one of the FIDIC 
contracts. For example, USAID policy documents promote the use of 
the 1987 Red Book for USAID-financed construction projects.12 
Although the choice of contract provisions ultimately rests with 
individual USAID field offices, USAID regulations and handbooks are 
all geared for use with the 1987 FIDIC.13  
In contrast, multilateral development banks have generally 
adopted, or agreed to adopt, FIDIC’s 2005 MDB contract, which in 
turn is based on FIDIC’s 1999 Red Book. The following banks both 
participated in drafting the MDB contract and have agreed to its use: 
 
• the African Development Bank; 
• the Asian Development Bank; 
• the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank; 
• the Caribbean Development Bank; 
• the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
• the Inter-American Development Bank; 
• the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank); 
• the Islamic Bank for Development; and  
• the Nordic Development Fund.14 
 
 
 
12 See generally USAID, Chapter 2: Procurement of Construction Services, in 
COUNTRY CONTRACTING HANDBOOK (2000), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ 
policy/ads/300/305mab.pdf. 
13 See USAID, ADS 311: Local Procurement (2000), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/311.pdf. 
14 Press Release, Enrico Vink, Managing Dir., FIDIC, Article for Information: 
Harmonised Edition of the FIDIC Construction Contract Agreed with the Multilateral 
Development Banks (Sept. 2005), available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/ 
contracts/cons_mdb_may05_press_release_cw_sep05.pdf. 
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The form of contract used by development agencies is not a trivial 
matter. These agencies fund construction projects that are both very 
costly and very important. Developing nations often depend on 
development aid for the construction of critical infrastructure, such as 
electrical and water treatment facilities. In addition, the sheer 
monetary value of these projects makes even small differences in 
contract provisions potentially very costly. 
The reports of selected development agencies demonstrate the 
magnitude of the issue. Since its founding in 1966, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) has spent over $55 billion on infrastructure 
projects.15 Infrastructure projects account for upwards of 60% of the 
ADB’s loans, which loans totaled $5.8 billion in 2005, not including 
grant monies.16 Likewise, between 1995 and 2005, the Inter-American 
Development Bank approved $8.4 billion in loans for infrastructure 
improvements.17 The World Bank lent $7.3 billion for infrastructure 
projects in 2005—one-third of its entire lending budget.18  
Thus, the FIDIC contracts govern a significant percentage of 
foreign and multilateral aid. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say 
that FIDIC contracts dominate international development construction 
projects. Yet that recognition comes with a caveat: two versions of the 
FIDIC contract are in use.19 USAID continues to use the 1987 version 
and development banks continue to use the 2005 MDB version.  
Was it wise for the multilateral development banks to adopt the 
MDB contract in 2005? Should USAID follow suit and abandon the 
1987 version in favor of the 1999 or the 2005 MDB contracts? 
Answering those questions requires understanding the differences 
between the various FIDIC contracts. 
 
III. THE COMPARISON: 1987 VERSUS 1999 AND MDB 
 
This Article compares two versions of the FIDIC Conditions of 
Contract: the 1987 version with the 1999 and MDB versions. The 
comparison that follows does not cover every difference between the 
versions. Rather, it focuses on the most substantial differences, 
 
 
15 Liqun Jin, Vice President, Asian Dev. Bank, Statement given at the FIDIC 
2005 Annual Conference: Sustainability and Developing Asia, (Sept. 5, 2005). 
16 ASIAN DEV. BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 20, 33 (2005). 
17 INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 23 (2005). 
18 WORLD BANK, 2005 ANN. REP. 15 (2005). 
19 Technically, there are three: 1987, 1999, and MDB. This paper treats the 1999 
and MDB contracts as the same unless noted otherwise. 
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particularly those that could impact the goals of foreign development, 
namely increasing the number and scope of development projects, as 
well as growing the local capacity within these states to sustain such 
projects.   
Before we begin, it is helpful to describe the various players in a 
typical development project. The Employer is the entity, usually a 
government agency in this context, that desires the infrastructure. 
Typically, the Employer will own the project once it is completed. The 
Contractor is the company hired to build the project. The Engineer is 
an engineering professional, hired by the Employer, to oversee the 
project from start to finish. The Engineer brings a level of technical 
expertise to the project that the Employer often lacks. As we will see, 
the Engineer occupies a sometimes-unclear position between the 
Employer and the Contractor. Finally, projects often utilize a 
Financer—an agency such as the World Bank that provides funds for 
the project.  
 
A. Comparison of Clauses 
 
1. Clause 2.4: Employer’s financial arrangements 
 
Clause 2.4 of the 1999 and MDB contracts introduces a provision 
that did not exist in the 1987 contract. Clause 2.4 requires the 
Employer to submit, within 28 days after a request from the 
Contractor, reasonable evidence that the Employer has the funds to 
pay the contract price.20 In addition, if the Employer intends to make a 
material change to its financial arrangements, the Employer must give 
notice to the Contractor along with detailed particulars. If the 
Contractor does not receive the requested evidence, it can reduce the 
rate of work, suspend work, and eventually terminate the contract.21  
 
2. Clause 3: The engineer 
 
Clause 3 marks a significant difference between the 1987 contract 
and the 1999 and MDB contracts. Unlike the 1987 version, where 
engineers were required to act impartially, under the 1999 and MDB 
 
 
20 Peter L. Booen & Gordon L. Jaynes, The FIDIC’s 1999 Forms of Contract, 
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION LAW (2001), available at http://www1.fidic.org/ 
resources/contracts/booen_mar01.asp. 
21 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 16. 
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versions the Engineer acts on behalf of the Employer.22 The Employer 
also has additional ability to control the Engineer under the 1999 and 
MDB contracts as compared with the 1987 version: the 1999 and 
MDB contracts allow the Employer to replace the Engineer, a power 
not given to the Employer by the 1987 contract.23 However, the 1999 
and MDB contracts include a check on the Employer’s new ability: the 
Contractor may veto a new engineer by raising reasonable and 
supported objections. 
In place of a neutral engineer, Clause 3 requires the Engineer to 
make “fair determinations” in specified circumstances.24 Yet some 
provisions do not invoke the fair determination requirement, such as 
termination of contract due to force majeure.25 The implication is that 
in these instances, the Engineer need not make fair determinations.26  
Clause 3.1 identifies the Engineer as personnel of the Employer. 
The result is that employers are now liable for the Engineer’s actions 
and determinations because the Engineer is an employee of the 
Employer under the 1999 and MDB contracts. Under Clause 17.1, the 
Employer indemnifies and holds harmless the Contractor for claims 
arising out of negligence, willful acts, or breach of contract by the 
Employer or its personnel. Although the Employer gains control over 
the Engineer, the Employer must also accept liability for the 
Engineer’s actions.  
 
3. Clause 4.1: Contractor’s general obligations 
 
The 1999 and MDB contracts add a fitness requirement that was 
not present in the 1987 version. If the Contractor must design any part 
of the works, those parts must be “fit for the [intended] purpose;” thus, 
requiring the Contractor to provide some level of warranty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Id. at cl. 3.1. 
23 Id. at cl. 3.4. 
24 Id. at cls. 3.5 (when invoked), 14.6 (interim payment certificates), & 14.13 
(final payment certificate). 
25 Id. at cl. 19.6. 
26 See David Bateson, FIDIC: New 1999 Edition of the Red Book: Impartiality 
of the Engineer, (Aug. 2000), available at http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/ 
bateson_aug00.asp.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
152 
4. Clause 4.12: Unforeseeable physical conditions 
 
The 1999 and MDB contracts include a significant change in the 
extent to which Contractors may claim additional payments on 
grounds of unforeseeable physical conditions.27 Under the 1999 and 
MDB versions, if the Contractor makes a claim for adverse physical 
conditions, the Engineer may review whether other physical conditions 
“in similar parts of the Works (if any)” were more favorable than 
could reasonably have been foreseen. If the answer to this question is 
yes, the Engineer, acting in his adjudicatory role, may reduce the 
amount of extra cost claimed by the amount saved by the unforeseen 
favorable conditions.28 Contrast the 1999 and MDB provision with the 
1987 contract, which does not provide for this sort of offsetting. Under 
the 1987 contract, negative unforeseeable conditions merit additional 
costs regardless of whether unforeseeable positive conditions are 
present elsewhere. The change has the effect of shifting risk to the 
Contractor.29  
 
5. Clause 15.5: Employer’s entitlement to termination 
 
Clause 15.5 of the 1999 and MDB contracts gives the Employer a 
power it does not have under the 1987 version: the power to terminate 
the contract for convenience. Under Clause 15.5, the Employer may 
terminate at any time for convenience, except in order to undertake the 
works itself or to arrange for another contractor to do so. Payment to 
the Contractor under these circumstances does not provide for profit—
merely costs.30 This clause creates the risk that the Contractor could 
realize no profit for the job if the Employer finds himself in a situation 
where termination of the project is required after the project has 
begun.31 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Booen & Jaynes, supra note 20.  
28 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.12. 
29 See EUR. INT’L CONTRACTORS (EIC), EIC CONTRACTOR’S GUIDE TO THE FIDIC 
“NEW RED BOOK” 
(rev. 2003) [hereinafter EIC]. 
30 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 19.6; see C.R. Seppala, FIDIC's New 
Standard Forms of Contract: Force Majeure, Claims, Disputes and Other Clauses, 
2000 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV., 235, pt. I(5), II (2000). 
31 See EIC, supra note 29. 
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6. Clause 17.3: Employer’s risks 
 
Clause 17 allocates risk of damage to the construction works 
between the Contractor and the Employer.32 For the most part, the 
Employer’s risks are the same under the 1999 and MDB contracts as 
they were under the 1987 contract. The Employer’s risks under the 
1999 and MDB contracts include losses resulting from the following: 
 
(a) wars and hostilities that may occur anywhere in the world; 
(b) rebellion, terrorism, and civil war, limited to the country of 
the works; 
(c) riot, commotion, disorder not by Contractor’s personnel, 
limited to the country of the works; 
(d) munitions of war, explosive materials, radiation not used 
by the Contractor (the 1987 contract did not list munitions 
of war and explosive materials under employer’s risks, but 
under the 1999 contract, this risk is limited to the country 
of works); 
(e) pressure waves from supersonic aircraft; 
(f) use or occupation by the Employer of works, unless 
specified otherwise; 
(g) design of works by the Employer or those for whom the 
Employer is responsible; 
(h) unforeseeable forces of nature or those against which an 
experienced contractor could not reasonably have been 
expected to take adequate preventive precautions. 
 
If the works suffer damage due to the Employer’s risks, the 
Contractor must rectify that damage if requested to do so by the 
Engineer. Clause 17 under the 1999 and MDB contracts entitles the 
Contractor to costs and extensions of time for this unexpected work.33 
However, it entitles the Contractor to profit for rectifying only losses 
caused by risks (f) and (g). This is a change from 1987, where the 
Contractor was entitled to profit from rectifying all of the Employer’s 
risks.34 This change increases the Contractor’s risk and decreases that 
of the Employer.  
 
 
 
32 See Nael G. Bunni, Recent Developments in Construction Disputology, 17 J. 
INT’L ARB. 105, 105 (2000). 
33 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 17.4. 
34 FIDIC 1987, supra note 9, at cls. 20.3 & 52. 
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7. Clause 17.6: Limitation of liability 
 
The 1987 contract does not contain clauses limiting the 
Contractor’s liability, but the 1999 and MDB versions do. Clause 17.6 
excludes the Contractor’s (and the Employer’s) liability for, among 
other things, loss of use of the construction works, loss of profit, loss 
of any contract, and indirect or consequential damage which may be 
suffered by the other party. The same clause also places a monetary 
limit on the Contractor’s total liability, unless stated otherwise in the 
contract. Clause 17.6 does not limit liability in cases of fraud, 
deliberate default, or reckless misconduct. 
 
8. Clause 19: Force majeure 
 
Clause 19 of the 1999 and MDB contracts introduces the concept 
of force majeure.35 “Force majeure” replaces “special risks” in Clause 
65 of the 1987 contract.36 Force majeure is defined as exceptional 
events or circumstances that are (a) beyond a Party’s control, (b) could 
not reasonably be provided against before entering into the contract, 
(c) having arisen, could not reasonably be avoided or overcome, and 
(d) are not substantially attributable to the other party.37 Clause 19.1 
provides a non-exhaustive list, including events such as war, 
hostilities, terrorism, riots, and natural disasters.  
The 1999 and MDB “force majeure” language is broader than the 
1987 “special risks” language. Under the 1987 contract, the only open-
ended language referred to natural disasters; otherwise, the list of 
special risks was exhaustive. Under the 1999 and MDB contracts, the 
definition of force majeure is entirely open-ended. An unimagined, but 
human-caused event would be covered if it met the criteria of 19.1. In 
this instance, the 1999 and MDB contracts give more risk to the 
Employer than does the 1987 version by encompassing a greater 
universe of events for which the Employer is essentially liable. 
If events of force majeure occur, they allow the Contractor to 
obtain extensions of time and incur additional costs.38  
 
 
 
 
35 Seppala, supra note 30, at pt. I(4). 
36 See Bunni, supra note 32 (criticizing the use of force majeure in lieu of special 
risks). 
37 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 19.1. 
38 Id. at cl. 19.4. 
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9. Clause 20: Claims, disputes, and arbitration 
 
The 1999 contract sets out an entirely new dispute resolution 
scheme. Under the 1987 contract, dispute resolution progressed 
according to article 67:  
 
Engineer’s Decision ? Amicable Settlement ? Arbitration.  
 
Clause 20 of the 1999 and MDB contracts provide instead for:  
 
Engineer’s Decision ? Dispute Adjudication Board ? Amicable 
Settlement ? Arbitration. 
 
At first glance, this change in process seems insignificant, yet the 
Dispute Adjudication Board (Dispute Board) system is robust. Under 
1999 and MDB Clause 20.2, the Dispute Board is to be formed in 
advance of actual disputes.39 It begins meeting when a dispute arises, 
and makes decisions according to a set of rules and procedures laid out 
in Clauses 20.2 through 20.5. The Dispute Board is made up of either 
one or three members, as specified in an appendix attached to the 
tender documents. The Dispute Board’s decisions are final, unless a 
party to the dispute gives notice of dissatisfaction within twenty-eight 
days. Regardless, Dispute Board decisions are immediately binding. 
Arbitration is possible only after going through the Dispute Board 
process, and even then only if a party has filed a timely notice of 
dissatisfaction with the Dispute Board’s decision.40  
 
B. Summary of the Comparison 
 
The two FIDIC contracts differ most obviously at the 
organizational level. The 1999 and MDB contracts categorize the 
seventy-two provisions found in the 1987 contract and arrange them 
into twenty clauses. Such modifications are essentially cosmetic; the 
number of actual provisions is about the same between the versions. 
 
 
39 See Seppala, supra note 30, at pt. II (discussing the difference between 
standing and ad hoc DABs). 
40 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 20.4. 
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Yet it would be a mistake to view the 1999 and MDB contracts as 
merely a reworking of the 1987 contract.41 While the 1999 and MDB 
contracts do contain some refinements to the 1987 version, they also 
contain substantive alterations that affect the way the contract 
functions.  
Changes in risk allocation are difficult to summarize. Compared to 
the 1987 contract, the 1999 and MDB versions shift some risks to the 
Contractor and other risks to the Employer. Without consulting 
actuarial data regarding particular projects in specific locations, it is 
meaningless to weigh these risks against each other in the hope of 
deciding whether the 1999 and MDB contracts transfer greater risk to 
one party or the other. What can be said is that none of the three 
contracts are unbalanced. Each assigns risk in a logical way, and all 
seem to provide a workable contractual framework. 
Changes in the dispute resolution mechanisms are fairly 
straightforward; however, it is useful to consider the role of the 
Engineer and the dispute settlement provisions together. Having given 
up on the idea of an impartial engineer, the FIDIC felt the need to 
insert another stage into the dispute settlement process: the Dispute 
Board. Practically speaking, the Dispute Board sits somewhere 
between amicable settlement and arbitration, providing a decision-
making body that allows parties to continue performance of the 
contract even during a dispute over the contract’s content or 
requirements.42  
In light of these changes, parties to foreign aid contracts must 
decide which set of contract provisions they prefer: those under the 
1987 version or those under the 1999 and MDB versions. The question 
then becomes which contract is better for development. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT 
 
The differences between the various FIDIC contracts are 
significant in two ways. First, the differences demonstrate the evolving 
nature of international finance contracts. More importantly, the 
differences have real-world implications for the practice of foreign 
development. Contractual provisions can promote or deter 
 
 
41 At least one of the drafters of the 1999 FIDIC contract agrees. Christopher 
Wade, FIDIC’s Standard Forms of Contract: Principles and Scope of the Four New 
Books, 2001 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV 5, (2001). 
42 See EIC, supra note 29 (discussing the relationship between an impartial 
engineer and the DAB). 
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development, and they can reduce or increase the costs of development 
projects. Given the size and importance of development construction 
projects, the implications of relevant contractual provisions deserve 
scrutiny. 
Some of the differences between the 1987 FIDIC contract and the 
1999 and MDB contracts will have little impact on development 
projects. These changes will be discussed in part A below. However, 
other changes have potentially wide reaching implications that will 
affect development in both positive and negative ways. Some of these 
changes will be discussed in part B below.  
 
A. Minor and Benign Changes 
 
Generally, it is inaccurate to think of the 1999 and MDB contracts 
as updated versions of the 1987 contract because the differences 
between the contract versions are simply too great. However, some 
differences can be viewed as mere updates, beneficial changes, or 
neutral modifications that do not have major implications for the 
utility of the contract as a whole.  
One example of a benign change is Clause 2.4 of the 1999 and 
MDB contracts. The requirement in Clause 2.4 that the Employer 
prove it has the ability to pay for the contract should not cause 
significant problems for international development projects. 
Development agencies, after all, should easily be able to demonstrate 
that they have sufficient funds to complete their obligations under a 
given contract. If the development agency cannot come up with such 
proof, then it seems there is nothing wrong with giving the Contractor 
the right to back out of the contract. In reality, ensuring that a 
perspective party to a contract has adequate funding is a basic practice. 
Clause 2.4 will likely forestall disputes and reduce contractors’ risks, 
which in turn, would allow contractors to perform construction 
projects at lower costs. Clause 2.4 is thus a minor, but welcome 
innovation to be viewed as the solidification of an already common 
practice. 
Another minor change, and welcome addition, is seen in Clause 
4.1 of the 1999 and MDB contracts. Clause 4.1 introduces a fitness 
requirement for contractor-designed portions of the contract. The 
rationale here is that the Contractor is in a better position than the 
Employer to reduce the risk that the Contractor’s designs are unfit; 
thus, it is efficient to require the Contractor’s designs to be “fit for the 
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purpose” that they were intended.43 Again, a small change to contract 
provisions works to reduce the cost of contracting and thus promotes 
foreign development. 
Clause 17.6 also marks a minor change for the better. By placing 
limits on the Contractor’s liability—such as by excluding loss of use 
of the works and loss of the Employer’s profits—the 1999 and MDB 
contracts reduce the Contractor’s risks. Facing less risk, a rational 
contractor can work for lower payments; thus, development projects 
are easier for development agencies to afford.  
Clause 19 has a similar effect. The 1999 and MDB contracts adopt 
the concept of “force majeure,” as opposed to “special risks,” the 
language used in the 1987 contract. In so doing, the 1999 contract 
expands the Employer’s risks by covering unforeseeable human and 
natural events; the 1987 clause covered unforeseeable natural events, 
but only certain specified human events. 
This expansion in the Employer’s liability is welcome. Force 
majeure risks—those risks that neither party can adequately prepare 
for—should be borne by the Employer. The Employer alone knows 
how valuable the project will prove to be and can thus determine, once 
a force majeure event has actually occurred, how much the Employer 
is willing to pay to recover from the unforeseen event. Contractors 
have no such ability because they must price contracts in advance of 
performance. If contractors bore the risk of force majeure events, they 
would be obliged to include significant “padding” into their contract 
prices to cover those risks. The result would be increasingly expensive 
contracts—and thus fewer development projects overall. 
Several other differences between the 1987 contract and the 1999 
and MDB contracts can be viewed in the same light.44 Viewed at best 
 
 
43 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.1. 
44 A good example of this is Clause 13.7’s treatment of changes in legislation 
and Clause 17.1’s indemnity provisions. Clause 13.7 of the 1999 and MDB contracts 
provides the Contractor with almost the same protection against changes in legislation 
as did Clause 70.2 of 1987. Two changes have been made: first, the “28 days prior to 
the latest date for submission” timing criterion of 1987 has been replaced with a 
simple reference to the base date of the contract; second, the 1999 and MDB versions 
expand the coverage of this provision to include changes in law arising from new 
judicial or governmental interpretations of existing laws, not only new laws and 
regulations themselves as under the 1987 contract.  
As for indemnities, the 1999 version requires the Contractor to indemnify the 
Employer for most of the same things required by 1987 version. One change has been 
made: under the 1999 and MDB versions, the Contractor is only liable for property 
damage (other than to the works) that arise out of (1) the Contractor’s design and 
execution of the works or (2) negligence or willful act or breach by the Contractor. 
17.1.a.ii. Contrast this with Clause 22.1 of the 1987 contract, which provides for 
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as updates or improvements to existing provisions, these changes are 
benign. Such changes may individually have only minor implications 
for foreign development contracts. However, these minor changes are 
desirable insofar as they encourage foreign development.  
 
B. The Engineer and the Dispute Board: A Major Change 
 
Changes to the role of the Engineer and to dispute resolution 
procedures are not minor. On the contrary, the magnitude of the 
differences between the 1987 contract and the 1999 and MDB 
contracts in these areas can hardly be overstated. Where the 1987 
contract calls for an impartial engineer, the 1999 and MDB contracts 
consider the Engineer to be an agent of the Employer.45 Where the 
1987 contract calls for informal mediation, the 1999 and MDB 
contracts call for formal adjudication. These large changes have 
equally sizeable implications for foreign development projects. 
At first glance, Clause 3’s adoption of a partial engineer seems 
undesirable. The Project Engineer is the liaison between the Employer 
and the Contractor, tasked with translating the sterile details of a 
contract into actual performance on the ground. The Engineer also 
plays a role in dispute resolution, examining disputes before they 
proceed to more formal means of dispute settlement. It seems 
appropriate that such a crucial intermediary as the Engineer be 
impartial. 
Yet it is not at all clear that project engineers are ever truly 
impartial. Development professionals have suggested that engineers 
are quite cognizant of who pays the bills for development projects.46 
Though under the 1987 contract engineers may be formally impartial, 
they may work closely with, and in effect take orders from the 
Employer. Against this backdrop, the provisions of the 1999 and MDB 
contracts make more sense. If engineers are never truly impartial, then 
                                                                                                          
Contractor liability regardless of fault. Thus, the 1999 contract reduces the 
Contractor’s risk as compared with the 1987 contract. 
The MDB contract differs from the 1999 contract regarding indemnities. Clause 
17.1(b) of the MDB contract remains truer to the 1987 version than does the 1999 
contract. The MDB version holds the Contractor liable for damages, regardless of the 
Contractor’s negligence or fault, unless the Employer’s own negligence or intentional 
acts caused the damage. In this instance, the MDB contract places greater risk on the 
Contractor than does the 1999 contract. 
45 For a discussion of differing treatment of the role of the Engineer in the FIDIC 
contracts, see Bateson, supra note 26. 
46 These development professionals are Project Engineers who, on condition of 
anonymity, spoke with the Author during several informal discussions. 
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it makes sense to contract around that fact—to recognize their 
partiality and deal with it. 
By making the Engineer’s relationship with the Employer explicit, 
the 1999 and MDB contracts clarify the relationships between the 
relevant actors. The new provisions no longer place the Engineer in 
the difficult, and perhaps unsustainable, position of being “neutral.” 
This change allows the parties, as well as the Engineer, to proceed 
with greater clarity than they could under the 1987 contract. This 
should result in a smoother and more efficient interaction between the 
parties involved, leading to a reduction in overall costs.  
However, it was not possible to merely abandon the neutrality of 
the Engineer. Under the 1987 contract, the Engineer had an important 
dispute resolution role to play: he or she functioned as a “quasi-
arbitrator,” deciding disputes before they proceeded to arbitration or 
adjudication.47 If the Engineer is not neutral, that dispute resolution 
role becomes awkward to say the least.  
Concerns about the neutrality of the Engineer prompted FIDIC to 
look for alternative-dispute-resolution mechanisms.48 The solution 
FIDIC settled on was the Dispute Adjudication Board, a dispute 
mechanism inserted into the dispute process that can realistically claim 
neutrality.49 The changes to the position of the Engineer and to dispute 
resolution are thus closely related. It is crucial to view development 
contracts holistically. The non-neutral Engineer and the Dispute Board 
must be viewed as a package.  
The Dispute Adjudication Board functions as a bridge between the 
two poles of dispute resolution procedures: on the one hand cheap, 
quick, and informal, but potentially biased dispute resolution by the 
Engineer; on the other, expensive, slow, formal, and neutral 
procedures such as binding arbitration and adjudication by courts. The 
Dispute Board occupies the middle ground. The Board is neutral and 
uses established procedures for investigation and decision-making. 
Yet, it is quicker and more flexible than arbitration or adjudication. 
The Board is a critical part of the 1999 and MDB contracts, although 
there are implications for development. 
To understand the impact of the Dispute Board, it is first necessary 
to understand where the idea of dispute boards originated. FIDIC 
 
 
47 Bunni, supra note 32 at 105. 
48 See id. at 107. 
49 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 20; FIDIC MDB 2005, supra note 11, at  
cl. 20. 
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certainly did not invent the concept.50 In fact, Dispute Boards—
confusingly sometimes called Dispute Adjudication Boards and 
sometimes Dispute Resolution Boards—have a long pedigree within 
the construction industry.51 Dr. Nael Bunni has tracked the popularity 
of dispute boards in the years leading up to their introduction in the 
FIDIC contract.52 Bunni has found that in 1988, dispute boards settled 
only sixteen construction disputes. By 1999, that number had risen to 
758, a 47-fold increase in just over ten years.53 The dollar value of 
contracts that include a Dispute Board provision had similarly 
increased from $1.4 billion in 1988 to $32.6 billion in 1999.54  
Dispute Boards became particularly popular outside of the United 
States. In England, Dispute Adjudication Boards are now mandatory 
for construction contracts.55 The World Bank also introduced dispute 
boards into its development projects, an innovation that served as the 
model upon which FIDIC Dispute Boards were ultimately based.56 
Dispute boards have a number of advantages over other dispute-
resolution systems. One particularly useful effect of the Dispute Board 
system is “effectively to prevent disputes and to assist the Parties in 
solving them as soon as [the disputes] appear.”57 Resolution is 
accomplished more quickly because the Dispute Boards are formed at 
the very beginning of contract performance. The boards are thus in 
place before any disputes arise, and can help parties reach solutions 
before problems get out of hand.58  
 
 
50 For a discussion of developments in FIDIC dispute resolution, see Bunni, 
supra note 32. 
51 Briefing, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Dispute Review Boards, (May 
2006), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/15119.pdf. 
52 Bunni, supra note 32. 
53 Id. at 112. 
54 Id. 
55 Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 167, 
204 (2001). 
56 Bunni, supra note 32 at 105, 107. However, note that the World Bank’s 
Dispute Resolution Board before the Bank’s adoption of the MDB contract functioned 
differently from the Dispute Board ultimately adopted by FIDIC. Most important, the 
FIDIC Board’s decisions are immediately binding on parties, while Board decisions 
under the old Bank contracts were binding only if neither party objected. Id. 
57 Pierre M. Genton, The DRB/DAB: An Attractive Procedure if One Takes 
Certain Precautions, 4 FOUNDATION FORUM, Issue 2 (2000). 
58 Pierre Genton labels this an “ongoing dispute resolution role” of the Dispute 
Board. He argues that dispute boards can be quite effective in managing “informal 
disputes,” disputes that have yet to progress to the stage where parties make formal 
claims against each other. Id. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
162 
Once a formal dispute has arisen, dispute boards are useful 
because they provide quick and binding decisions. Parties may object 
to the Dispute Board’s decisions, and pursue further adjudication; 
however, the Dispute Board’s decision remains binding throughout 
this process. The binding nature of Board decisions allows parties to 
move forward with performance of the contract, even while pursuing 
adjudication of disputes.59  
Finally, dispute boards are useful in situations “where recourse to 
local courts is undesirable.”60 Perhaps local courts are seen as 
inefficient, expensive, corrupt, or biased; in such a case, dispute 
boards offer a binding alternative, significantly reducing the need for 
local courts’ involvement in the dispute process. 
Dispute boards reduce and manage conflict, allow performance to 
continue despite disputes, and minimize recourse to local courts. To be 
fair, these benefits are partially offset by additional costs. The addition 
of an extra layer of dispute procedures potentially increases the costs 
and time associated with dispute resolution. For example, Board 
members must be paid, and Board investigations could disrupt the 
construction process. Nevertheless, the benefits associated with the use 
of dispute boards outweigh the costs. By providing a flexible but 
robust dispute-resolution mechanism, the board system should allow 
construction contracts to proceed more smoothly and efficiently than 
was possible without dispute boards. Dispute boards provide a 
relatively fast and inexpensive alternative to the more cumbersome 
formal adjudication procedures.  
Viewed as a single set of reforms, the changes to the status of the 
Engineer and to dispute-resolution provisions mark a significant 
advancement in development contracts. When it comes to these issues, 
the 1999 and MDB contracts are superior to the 1987 contract for 
development purposes. 
 
C. Unforeseeable Physical Conditions:  
A Questionable Shift in Risk 
 
Not all changes between the FIDIC contracts are so welcome. The 
1999 and MDB contracts treat unforeseeable physical conditions quite 
differently than does the 1987 contract. On balance, this change is 
counter-productive.  
 
 
59 Mistelis, supra note 55, at 204 (terming board decisions “binding, but not 
necessarily final”). 
60 Genton, supra note 57. 
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Under the 1987 contract, a contractor that encountered 
unforeseeable conditions—for example, large rocks hidden under the 
soil—was entitled to additional costs and extensions of time from the 
Employer. The same holds true for 1999 and MDB version, but with a 
crucial difference: the Engineer can now offset extra costs and time if 
he or she finds unforeseeable beneficial conditions elsewhere in the 
project site.61 
The effect of this change is to shift risk from the Employer to the 
Contractor. Under the 1987 contract, the Employer bore the risk of all 
unforeseen conditions. Yet under the 1999 and MDB contracts, the 
Employer bears only the risk of unforeseen negative conditions that 
are not offset by unforeseen positive conditions. Contractors will get 
fewer extensions of time and fewer additional costs under these new 
provisions. 
At first glance, the change seems desirable. In principle, 
contractors should not be awarded additional costs and time if, on 
balance, other parts of the project turn out to be easier, faster, or 
cheaper than expected. It seems only fair that beneficial and 
detrimental conditions should be considered together. 
However, that which is equitable is not always efficient. By 
shifting risk to the Contractor, the 1999 and MDB contracts could 
cause contractors to demand unnecessarily high prices. This, in turn, 
would reduce the number and scope of development projects 
development agencies can afford. 
In order to understand this problem, it helps to consider the 
reasons for including an unforeseen conditions provision in the first 
place. For example, consider a contract that did not include an 
unforeseen-conditions provision where a contractor has agreed to 
excavate a foundation for some specified amount of money and in a 
certain number of days. An experienced contractor will know, in 
advance, that unforeseeable conditions could delay progress or 
increase expenses. The Contractor will thus increase the price he or 
she charges in an attempt to cover that possibility. The question 
remains—how much should the Contractor “pad” the price? These 
risks are, by definition, unforeseeable. The Contractor is thus forced to 
overestimate the danger of unforeseen risks, lest he or she be left with 
an unprofitable job.  
Contrast that situation with a contract containing an unforeseeable-
conditions clause. Under this type of contract, the Contractor is able to 
 
 
61 FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 4.12; FIDIC MDB 2005, supra note 11, at 
cl. 4.12. 
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quote a price that covers the cost of the job and no more, without 
worrying about unforeseeable conditions. If unforeseeable conditions 
do arise, the contract price can be increased appropriately.  
An unforeseeable-conditions clause results in cheaper contracts for 
two reasons. First, the clause removes the need for contractors to pad 
their contract prices.62 For projects that do not encounter unforeseeable 
conditions, this will result in lower costs. Second, the clause changes 
the time at which costs of unforeseeable events are to be calculated. 
Without the clause, these costs must be estimated—or more 
accurately, guessed—in advance. In such a situation, overestimating 
the cost is likely. With the clause, the costs can be tailored to the 
actual conditions encountered; there is no need for overestimating 
risk.63 Unforeseeable-conditions clauses thus minimize the costs of 
construction projects whether or not unforeseen conditions actually 
arise. 
Thus, it becomes clear that an unforeseeable-conditions clause 
should be included in international development contracts. But what is 
wrong with the 1999 and MDB provisions? Clause 4.12 provides for 
additional costs and extensions of time, as long as they are not offset 
by unforeseeable positive conditions. One might argue that the 
balancing of positive and negative unforeseeable conditions is a 
superior way to allocate risk because it avoids giving extra costs and 
extensions of time to the Contractor when they are not actually 
needed.  
This argument is mistaken. By introducing the concept of 
conditions-balancing, the 1999 and MDB contracts have given 
contractors a reason to once again pad their prices.64 The problem is 
risk: contractors cannot be certain that engineers (and dispute boards, 
etc.) will correctly weigh unforeseen positive and negative 
conditions.65 There is a danger that engineers will consider an 
 
 
62 Hazel Glenn Beh, Allocating the Risk of the Unforeseen, Subsurface and 
Latent Conditions in Construction Contracts: Is There Room for the Common Law?, 
46 KAN. L. REV. 115, 133 (1997). 
63 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution, 
Relationship, and Revision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 799, 813 n. 65 (1989). 
64 It is difficult to prove this assertion. Contractors who bid for projects will not 
be willing to admit that they are padding their prices, but it is rational for them to do 
so for the reasons given. As with much of contract law, the goal should be to design 
away these temptations, even if the danger is only theoretical. 
65 Other dangers of risk shifting exist. “[M]erely transferring risks blindly from 
the Employer to the Contractor will not necessarily better ensure that the works are 
done on time or at the agreed price. Instead, this may, at best, cause more claims and 
disputes and, at worst, bankrupt the Contractor, thereby requiring the Employer to re-
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unforeseen to condition to be offset by an unforeseeable positive 
condition when in fact it is not; rational contractors will respond to 
that possibility by padding their prices. Therefore, a major purpose of 
unforeseeable-conditions clauses is undermined. 
There is another problem with Clause 4.12. No matter how 
equitable or fair the clause is, it increases the likelihood of disputes 
because contractors are likely to view findings of beneficial conditions 
with hostility. The clause makes an already difficult determination 
even more complex66 by providing parties with one more thing to 
argue about. It is not a minor point: disputes about whether or not 
unforeseen conditions are offset by other unforeseen conditions could 
be costly to resolve and almost impossible to settle.  
It was a mistake to change the unforeseeable-conditions clause. 
The 1999 and MDB provisions on unforeseeable conditions are likely 
to increase the cost of contracting and lead to protracted disputes, thus 
making international development projects more difficult to fund and 
complete. Therefore, the 1987 provisions are preferable on this issue. 
 
D. The Risk of Realizing No Profits 
 
FIDIC made another change for the worse when dealing with 
contractors’ profits. In two key situations, the 1999 and MDB 
contracts reduce or eliminate the ability of contractors to profit from 
their work. The risk of an unprofitable job is a serious deterrent to any 
contractor, and it has major consequences for international 
development.  
Ultimately, the profit clauses are counterproductive; they impair, 
not promote, international development. The clauses at issue are 15.5 
and 17.3. Clause 15.5 sets out the Employer’s entitlement to 
termination. If the Employer exercises that right, and terminates the 
contract before it has been completed, the Employer need only pay the 
Contractor costs, not profit. Even if the Contractor has completed 
ninety-nine percent of the contract, the Employer’s right to termination 
destroys the Contractor’s ability to profit from the job. The best he or 
she can do is break even.  
                                                                                                          
bid the job and, almost inevitably, pay a higher price to get the work done.” C.R. 
Seppala, FIDIC's New Standard Forms of Construction Contract: an Introduction 
(2000), http://www1.fidic.org/resources/contracts/seppala.asp. 
66 This information was obtained during informal discussions between the 
Author and several Development Project Engineers who later asked that their remarks 
remain anonymous. These Engineers indicated that awards of additional cost and time 
extensions are judgment calls at best. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
166 
A similar result is reached under Clause 17.3, which sets out 
“Employer’s Risks.” If there are events and circumstances that may 
harm the project, the resulting damage must be paid for by the 
Employer, not the Contractor. Clause 17.3 includes such things as war, 
natural disasters, and riots. The problem with this clause is not the risk 
allocation itself; it is how damage to the project is to be rectified. 
Clause 17.4 requires the Contractor to rectify damage to the project 
that results from the Employer’s risks. The Contractor is entitled to 
extra payments covering his or her additional costs in this situation, 
but not any additional profits.67 If a hurricane destroys a project one 
week before completion, the Contractor would have to rebuild the 
entire project—often a task of years, given the size of development 
projects—but will receive no additional profits to compensate for the 
opportunity cost the Contractor has incurred. This clause is 
particularly harmful given the great amount of profit a contractor 
could potentially lose due to the increased time needed to complete a 
project.  
These provisions are not typical in construction contracts. The lack 
of profit in the event of employer’s termination is particularly 
extraordinary. Discussing contracts with the United States 
Government, one commentator writes, “In virtually every case, the 
termination for convenience clause entitles the Contractor to recover 
costs incurred, profit on work done, and costs of preparing the 
termination proposal no matter what type of contract it executed with 
the Government.”68 Even the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit held that contractors are entitled to “costs incurred, profit on 
work done and the costs of preparing the termination settlement 
proposal” when a contract has been terminated for the convenience of 
the Employer.69 Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Government 
recognize that entitlement, stating that “[a] settlement should 
compensate the Contractor fairly for the work done and the 
preparations made for the terminated portions of the contract, 
including a reasonable allowance for profit.”70  
 
 
67 But see FIDIC 1999, supra note 10, at cl. 17.4; FIDIC MDB 2005, supra note 
11, at cl. 17.4 (stating that the Contractor is entitled to extra profits when the risks are 
the fault of the Employer or agents thereof).  
68 Graeme S. Henderson, Terminations for Convenience and the Termination 
Costs Clause, 53 A.F. L. REV. 103, 104 (2002) (emphasis added). 
69 Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
70 48 C.F.R. § 49.201(a) (2005) (discussing termination for convenience in 
fixed-cost contracts). “The FAR is the primary regulation for use by all Federal 
Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated 
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As for the question of profit on rectifying damage caused by 
employers’ risks, “courts are often willing to award contractor profits 
for extra work, even when not provided by the contract.”71 The 1999 
and MDB contracts, however, do not allow contractors to claim profits 
in either of these two instances. That marks a significant change from 
the 1987 contract, which allowed profit both in the event of 
termination for convenience and for rectifying damage. Under the 
1999 and MDB contracts, a contractor’s ability to make a profit is at 
the mercy of both the employers, and fate. 
This is bad policy. First, the risk that a contractor could be left 
with no profits might induce some contractors to—dishonestly—
overprice their “costs” in order to guarantee that they will walk away 
from a job with money in their pockets. As for employers, their ability 
to determine whether contractors will receive profits can work as a 
bludgeon, allowing opportunistic employers to take advantage of a 
contractor’s weak position.72 These clauses bring out the worst in 
contractors and employers. 
The problems go beyond dishonest or opportunistic parties. Even 
if everyone involved acts in good faith, the danger of realizing no 
profits will retard the goals of international development. The key is 
the notion of profit, and how it means different things to different 
types of contractors. For example, consider a water infrastructure 
project in a developing country, funded by a multilateral development 
bank. Some projects will be of such a size that local contractors have 
the capacity to do the job; however, other projects will be too large, 
and only foreign construction firms will suffice. From time to time, 
both local and foreign contractors will be interested in a job, and it is 
here that profit becomes most important. 
For a multinational construction corporation, the risk of realizing 
no profits is just one more risk to factor into the contract price. 
Furthermore, that risk can be spread out across numerous construction 
projects around the world, effectively diversifying the company’s risk 
portfolio. Most importantly, the achievement of profit has little or 
nothing to do with the salaries received by the corporation’s decision 
makers. They receive a salary, which is then factored into the “cost” 
portion of the contract itself. Their personal income is only indirectly, 
if at all, tied to the profits of an individual contract. 
                                                                                                          
funds.” U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., REGULATORY REFERENCE OVERVIEW, 
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8199&channelId=-
13342 (last visited April 24, 2007). 
71 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., supra note 63, at 840. 
72 See id. 
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Contrast that example with a smaller, privately held construction 
company, likely operating in only one country. The small company 
can price the risk of no profits into its contract price, but it cannot 
diversify that risk to anywhere near the same extent as can a large 
company. That fact alone is likely to make a small contractor more 
risk averse than a large contractor, yet it gets worse. For a privately or 
closely held company, profits are often directly tied to the income of 
decision-makers in the company. Indeed, for a private company, the 
owner may not even receive a salary; the profits and the owner’s take-
home pay may be one and the same.73 
To put it bluntly, if a large corporation receives no profits, its 
shareholders receive no dividends. If a small company receives no 
profits, its owner may not be able to buy food. Since profit means 
different things to different types of contractors, the risk of realizing 
no profits has a differential impact as well. The risk of no profits will 
serve to weed out small, local contractors. The water treatment plant 
still gets built, but not by locals. That result is bad for development. 
With a development project, building the infrastructure is just part of 
the goal: the development of local capacity is also crucial to the long-
term growth of developing states.74 The 1999 and MDB contracts’ 
shortsightedness ignores the need to promote local contractors, which 
is bad for development.75  
Clauses 15.5 and 17.3 are large steps in the wrong direction. 
Compared to the 1987 contract, the 1999 and MDB version treats 
 
 
73 Glenn Beh, supra note 62, at 152 n.160 (making a similar but more technical 
argument). 
74 For that matter, the same could be said for developed states. Gene Ming Lee, 
A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1091 
(1996) (“Government construction serves many purposes [besides providing 
infrastructure]. . . . Spending on public works also provides a stimulus to the local 
economy through the creation of jobs”). 
75 There may be other reasons to maintain a large pool of potential contractors as 
well. See Glenn Beh, supra note 62, at 135–36. (“A large owner, especially the federal 
government, may have an interest in protecting and maintaining a financially healthy 
pool of qualified bidders for its projects and find this desirable even though it 
increases its own costs. After all, these large owners conduct business through bidding 
and each needs a pool of bidders in order to ensure competition. Additionally, the 
large owner may require extremely specialized work that only a small group of 
contractors can perform. One very costly job may drive a contractor out of business, 
eventually hurting the large owner who requires specialized services in multiple 
contracts . . . Moreover, contractors may elect not to bid on high-risk projects, finding 
the risks unacceptably high. In the long run, a reluctance to compete among qualified 
bidders injures the large owner.”) 
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profit in a way that is unfair, costly, discriminatory in impact, and 
counter-productive.  
 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Not all the differences between the 1987 contract and the more 
recent 1999 and MDB versions are so undesirable. As we have seen, 
some changes are advantageous. Some of these improvements are 
minor, but others are revolutionary: the adoption of a Dispute 
Adjudication Board is a particularly welcome development.  
Nonetheless, it is not at all clear that development agencies should 
adopt the more recent versions of the FIDIC contract. Construction 
projects funded by development agencies form a crucial part of some 
countries’ infrastructure. Tinkering with the contracts that govern 
those projects should only happen when necessary, and only if done 
with great care.  
Neither the 1999 contract nor the 2005 contract written by the 
development banks should be used for development projects. These 
contracts are likely to result in costlier projects, reduction in 
competition, and disadvantages to those who need development aid 
most. However, it is not necessary to abandon the 1999 and MDB 
contracts entirely because their improvements, especially the creation 
of a dispute board, can and should be incorporated into development 
contracts on a piecemeal basis.  
An even better solution would be the creation of a 2007 standard 
form contract similar in style and form to the 1999 and 2005 contracts. 
It should retain the positive changes as outlined in this paper and 
incorporate the unenforceable conditions clause found in the original 
1987 standard. Likewise, Clauses 15.5 and 17.3 should be removed. 
The decision by development agencies to update their construction 
contracts is laudable. Development projects should be governed by the 
most effective contract provisions available, and innovations in the 
law should be embraced, but change is not always desirable. In 
international development contracts, the touchstone must always be 
development: if a contract does not promote development, it is 
counterproductive. Such is the case with the new FIDIC contracts. 
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